UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SUSAN F. o/b/o K.G.P.,

Plaintiff,

v. 8:23-CV-0866 (ML)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

COLLINS & HASSELER, PLLC Counsel for the Plaintiff 225 State Street Carthage, New York 13619 LAWRENCE D. HASSELER, ESQ.

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION Counsel for the Defendant 6401 Security Boulevard Baltimore, Maryland 21235 SHANNON FISHEL, ESQ. Special Assistant U.S. Attorney

MIROSLAV LOVRIC, United States Magistrate Judge

## **ORDER**

Currently pending before the Court in this action, in which Plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Commissioner of Social Security, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings.<sup>1</sup> Oral argument was

This matter, which is before me on consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), has been treated in accordance with the procedures set forth in General Order No. 18. Under that General Order once issue has been joined, an action such as this is considered procedurally, as if cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings had been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

heard in connection with those motions on September 5, 2024, during a telephone conference conducted on the record. At the close of argument, I issued a bench decision in which, after applying the requisite deferential review standard, I found that the Commissioner's determination was not supported by substantial evidence, providing further detail regarding my reasoning and addressing the specific issues raised by Plaintiff in this appeal.

After due deliberation, and based upon the Court's oral bench decision, which has been transcribed, is attached to this order, and is incorporated herein by reference, it is

**ORDERED** as follows:

1) Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 8) is GRANTED.

2) Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 12) is DENIED.

3) The Commissioner's decision denying Plaintiff Social Security benefits is

REVERSED.

4) This matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner, without a directed finding of

disability, for further administrative proceedings consistent with this opinion and the oral bench

decision, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

5) The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment, based upon this

determination, REMANDING this matter to the Commissioner for further administrative

proceedings consistent with this opinion and the oral bench decision, pursuant to sentence four

of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and closing this case.

Dated: September 11, 2024

Binghamton, New York

Miroslav Lovric

United States Magistrate Judge

Miroslav Fario

Northern District of New York

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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SUSAN E. F. o/b/o K.G.P.,

Plaintiff,

vs. 23-CV-866

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

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## DECISION - September 5, 2024

## the HONORABLE MIROSLAV LOVRIC, presiding

APPEARANCES (by telephone)

For Plaintiff: COLLINS & HASSELER, PLLC

225 State Street Carthage, NY 13619

BY: LAWRENCE D. HASSELER, ESQ.

For Defendant: SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Office of the General Counsel

6401 Security Blvd. Baltimore, MD 21235

BY: SHANNON FISHEL, ESQ.

Eileen McDonough, RPR, CRR
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THE COURT: Minor Plaintiff K.G.P.'s mother has commenced this proceeding on his behalf pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 405(g) to challenge the adverse determination by the Commissioner of Social Security finding that K.G.P. was not disabled at the relevant times and therefore ineligible for Supplemental Security Income benefits.

By way of background the Court notes as follows:

Plaintiff was born in 2008. And Plaintiff here that I am

referring to is the minor on whose behalf his mother brought

this action. Plaintiff is currently approximately 16 years

old. He was approximately 12 years old on the date of his

application for benefits. At the time of the ALJ's decision,

Plaintiff was approximately 5 feet, 4inches in height and

weighed approximately 196 pounds.

Plaintiff was diagnosed with speech and language deficits when he enrolled in preschool, and has received special education assistance throughout his academic career due to difficulties arising from his diagnosed learning disabilities and his mental health symptoms. His mental health treatment includes prescription medication and regular therapy sessions.

During the period under review, Plaintiff's individualized education plan included reduced class sizes for approximately half a school day so he could receive

assistance in math, reading and other subjects. remainder of the school day was spent in larger, traditional classes. During the most recent academic year reflected in the record, Plaintiff was in the seventh grade but was limited to remote online classes for an extended period due to the coronavirus pandemic. Since December of 2021 Plaintiff has been part of a home school program, so he is not enrolled in a formalized special education program. 

Procedurally the Court notes as follows for this case. Plaintiff's mother applied for Title XVI benefits on his behalf on September 8, 2020, alleging an onset date of January 1, 2012.

Transcript at page 9.

Plaintiff's application for benefits alleges disability based on mental health impairments including autism spectrum disorder, depression, anxiety, and various speech and language disorders.

Administrative Law Judge Jennifer Gale Smith conducted a hearing by videoconference on November 18, 2021 to address Plaintiff's application for benefits. ALJ Smith issued an unfavorable decision on December 2 of 2021. That decision became the final determination of the agency on June 7, 2023, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review.

This action was commenced on July 14, 2023 and it

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1 | is timely.

In her December 2, 2021 decision at issue in this case, the ALJ first determined that Plaintiff was an adolescent at all relevant times between the date of the application and the date of the ALJ's decision. The ALJ then applied the three-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether the minor Plaintiff is disabled as defined under the Act.

First, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the application date of September 8, 2020.

At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: Autism spectrum disorder, learning disability in reading, anxiety disorder, depressive disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, speech or language impairment, allergic rhinitis, and obesity.

At step three, the ALJ assessed whether Plaintiff's severe impairments meet, medically equal, or functionally equal the criteria of any listed impairment. In making this determination, the ALJ expressly considered several listings. The ALJ considered listing at 103.02, dealing with chronic respiratory disorders. Next, the ALJ considered listing 112.04, dealing with depressive, bipolar, and related disorders. Next, the ALJ considered listing 112.06, dealing

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with anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders. The ALJ considered listing at 112.10, dealing with autism spectrum disorder. And the ALJ considered listing 112.11, dealing with neuro-developmental disorders.

Most relevant to this proceeding are the mental health listings. In order to meet or medically equal one of these, an individual must exhibit an extreme limitation of one, or a marked limitation of two of the following domains of mental functioning. Extreme means a child has an impairment that very seriously interferes with a child's ability to independently initiate, sustain or complete activities. See 20 C.F.R. Section 416.926a(e). Marked indicates that he or she has an impairment that seriously interferes with the ability for independently initiating, sustaining, or completing activities. Those domains of mental functioning are the following:

First, understanding, remembering, or applying information; next, interacting with others; next, concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace; and lastly, adapting or managing oneself.

The ALJ found Plaintiff has a marked limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information, but no more than moderate limitations in the other domains. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or

1 | medically equaled the severity of any listed impairments.

The ALJ continued her analysis and found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that functionally equaled the severity of a listed impairment. Specifically, the ALJ evaluated the six domains of functioning and found that Plaintiff had, first, a marked limitation in acquiring and using information; next, less than marked limitations in attending and completing tasks, interacting and relating with others, caring for himself, and health and physical well-being; and lastly, no limitation in moving about and manipulating objects.

Thus, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have a marked limitation in two or more of the functional domains and did not have an extreme limitation in any one domain.

Having concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets, medically equals, or functionally equals the severity of a listed impairment, the ALJ therefore found that Plaintiff was not disabled.

The Court next turns to Plaintiff's arguments.

First, I begin by indicating, as you know, this Court's functional role in this case is limited and extremely deferential. The Court must determine whether correct legal principles are applied and whether the determination is

supported by substantial evidence, defined as such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind would find sufficient to
support a conclusion. As the Second Circuit noted in Brault
v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, 683 F.3d, at

5 | 443, a 2012 case, the standard is demanding, more so than the

6 | clearly erroneous standard. The Court in *Brault* also

7 | indicated that once there is a finding of fact, that fact can

be rejected only if a reasonable factfinder would have to

9 | conclude otherwise.

In this appeal Plaintiff raises primarily and essentially three primary contentions for this proceeding. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly explain her finding that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet, medically equal, or functionally equal a listed impairment. Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinion evidence from Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist and Plaintiff's teachers. And third, Plaintiff also argues that the Appeals Council erred by refusing to consider a psychological assessment performed after the date of the ALJ's decision.

The Court begins its analysis as follows. This

Court finds that the ALJ failed to support her evaluation of
the medical opinions, teacher evaluations, and hearing
testimony with substantial evidence because she omitted key
portions of the teacher evaluations from her analysis. This

Court further finds that the Appeals Council committed error by summarily rejecting a psychological evaluation that related back to the period reviewed by the ALJ. Accordingly, this Court holds that remand for further administrative findings is required to properly evaluate the medical opinion and other evidence.

The Court will now turn to the ALJ's incomplete analysis of teacher evaluations. When considering the domain of attending and completing tasks, an ALJ considers how well a child is able to focus and maintain attention, and how well the child begins, carries through, and finishes activities, including the pace he or she performs at and the ease at which he or she changes between them.

In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had less than marked limitations in attending and completing tasks, and a moderate limitation in the related functional domain of concentration, persistence and pace. As support, the ALJ cited teacher evaluations describing Plaintiff as working to the best of his ability, appearing engaged, and being one of the few students to keep his camera on and look at the screen during online class discussions.

The same teacher evaluations express serious concerns about Plaintiff's ability to maintain attention and concentration and finish tasks, but these concerns were excluded from the ALJ's analysis. For example, Plaintiff's

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social studies teacher observed that Plaintiff seems engaged, but most often cannot respond appropriately to questions and appears attentive in class, but is most often unable to follow directions to complete assignments afterwards. Plaintiff's science teacher found that Plaintiff was an enthusiastic student but simply can't do the work he is She noted that although Plaintiff receives resource room assistance from another teacher, in that time he is not 8 able to get help with all subjects due to the amount of help he needs and his work is almost completely incorrect for every assignment. One of Plaintiff's special education teachers noted that Plaintiff completes most work on time, 13 although it's often because it is not done well.

This Court finds similar unaddressed issues in the ALJ's evaluation of Plaintiff's ability to interact and relate to others. In assessing this domain, an ALJ is expected to consider how well a child initiates and sustains emotional connections with others, develops and uses the language of his or her community, cooperates with others, complies with rules, responds to criticism, and respects and takes care of the possessions of others. See 20 C.F.R. Section 416.926A(i). For adolescents, this includes the ability to initiate and develop friendships with children their own age and to relate appropriately to other children and adults, to solve conflicts between themselves and others,

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to intelligently express feelings, and to ask for assistance 1 2 when needed. The applicable regulations and the related case 3 law have emphasized the importance of assessing speech and language impairments, such as Plaintiff's documented 4 5 difficulties with receptive language, when evaluating a child's ability to engage in social interaction. See case of 6 7 Miller o/b/o K.A.M. versus Commissioner of Social Security, that's 19-cv-498, a 2020 Westlaw case found at 4338893, at 8 9 page 3. That's a Western District New York, July 28, 2020 10 case. And therein the judge also cites a collection of cases 11 standing for this proposition.

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When assessing Plaintiff's ability to interact and relate to others, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's teachers report no more than minimal limitations in this area and describe Plaintiff as pleasant, tolerant, polite, patient, helpful and respectful. As a general statement, this is accurate. However, none of the teacher evaluations were based on observations of Plaintiff's behavior in an in-person classroom setting, and all cautioned that it was difficult to assess social interaction during virtual learning. The ALJ's decision makes a passing reference to online schooling, but does not discuss the impact that virtual learning had on the teachers' ability to reliably evaluate some aspects of Plaintiff's classroom performance.

Even with the limits of virtual learning,

Plaintiff's teachers identified difficulties interacting and relating to others. For example, Plaintiff's social studies teacher observed that Plaintiff appeared engaged, but rarely responded appropriately to questions and his vocabulary and his ability to explain classroom concepts were below his grade level. Plaintiff's science teacher noted that she had no direct observation of Plaintiff's ability to interact with his classmates, but that Plaintiff had shown problems expressing himself due to difficulty finding the right words. Beyond weekly online classes, this teacher had limited direct interaction with Plaintiff because he had not participated in any of her individual online office hours. Several teachers commented that Plaintiff often was unable to recognize when he should ask for help with difficult assignments.

Although teachers are not medical sources, their evaluations are considered unquestionably probative evidence for assessing the severity of a child's impairment and the associated functional limitations, in light of a teacher's typically close interaction with students on a regular basis. In this case, the ALJ found multiple teacher evaluations more persuasive than the opinion of Dr. Joshua Frank, had who been Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist for four years at the time of his decision. Dr. Frank opined that Plaintiff had a number of extreme or marked limitations. Because the ALJ's decision omits key portions of these teacher evaluations that

are suggestive of potentially greater limitations, this

Court's ability to perform a meaningful review of the ALJ's

evaluation of the opinion evidence and the resulting

disability determination is frustrated, and remand is

required. See case of Rosemary B. versus Commissioner of

Social Security, 21-cv-241. That is a Magistrate Judge

Baxter case, 2022 Westlaw 11130736, at page 5. And that is a

Northern District New York, October 19, 2022 decision by

Magistrate Judge Baxter. And therein Judge Baxter found

ALJ's selective citation of record created appearance of

cherry-picking evidence and was legal error requiring remand.

This Court recognizes that ALJs are not required to reconcile every conflicting shred of evidence in their decisions. However, it is equally true that ALJs must discuss the evidence and factors crucial to the disability determination with sufficient specificity to enable this Court to decide whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence. Put another way, an ALJ must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to her conclusion to enable a meaningful review.

The ALJ's incomplete explanation of the teacher evaluations fails to build this necessary bridge to support her conclusion that Plaintiff has less than marked limitations in his ability to attend and complete tasks, maintain attention and concentration, and engage in social

interaction. This Court cannot say that the evidence in the record as a whole definitively supports greater limitations, but this Court does find that the ALJ failed to provide the requisite explanation to enable review of whether her findings were supported by substantial evidence.

Because the ALJ already found a marked limitation in Plaintiff's ability to acquire and use information, her errors cannot be considered harmless because a finding of greater limitation in either attending and completing tasks or social interaction would have resulted in a finding that Plaintiff is in fact disabled. Therefore, remand for further consideration is required.

The ALJ's incomplete analysis of the teacher evaluations also raises questions regarding her evaluation of the testimonial evidence. Plaintiff's mother testified that Plaintiff worked hard but struggled with math and reading in school, had few friends or social activities, and had difficulty staying focused on chores and recreational activities such as movies and games. Plaintiff's father and grandmother expressed similar concerns in written testimony. The ALJ discounted this testimony, and instead credited Plaintiff's own testimony that he was doing well in school, had many friends, and did chores such as laundry, washing dishes, cleaning the kitchen, making his bed, and taking out the trash.

Although the ALJ has great discretion in evaluating subjective testimony, she must provide a sufficient basis for a reviewing court to determine whether the reasons for crediting or discrediting testimony were supported by substantial evidence. See case of Candy A.O. versus Kijakazi, that's 20-cv-766, and that is a Magistrate Judge David Peebles case, found at 2022 Westlaw 226804, at page 12, and that's a Northern District of New York, January 26, 2022 case issued by Judge Peebles. Plaintiff's teachers opined that Plaintiff often overestimated his abilities and had an honest but mistaken belief that he did not need help from others. The ALJ's failure to discuss these concerns before crediting Plaintiff's assessment of his own abilities is an additional error that raises questions regarding her disability determination, and should be revisited on remand.

Turning next to the new and material evidence before the Appeals Council. While Plaintiff's request for review was pending, his counsel filed a summary report of a Psychological Assessment performed on January 30th of 2023 that assessed Plaintiff's cognitive and adaptive functioning at the age of 14. The Appeals Council found that the Assessment did not affect the ALJ's decision about whether Plaintiff was disabled on or before December 2 of 2021.

Evidence generated after an ALJ's decision cannot be deemed irrelevant solely because of timing. See case of

Carrera v. Colvin, 13-cv-1414. And that is a district court, 1 2 Gary L. Sharpe decision, 2015 Westlaw 1126014, at page 8. 3 And that's a Northern District of New York, March 12, 2015 decision by Judge Sharpe. Likewise, categorical refusal to 4 5 consider new and material evidence solely because it was created after the date of the administrative law judge's 6 7 decision can constitute reversible error. See case of

Carrera that I just cited. Also see case of Pollard v. 8

9 Halter, 377 F.3d 183, at page 193. And that's a Second

Circuit 2004 case. 10

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Although the Psychological Assessment report was dated February 28, 2023, its authors referenced evaluations already in the administrative record and found Plaintiff's then current cognitive scores and adaptive abilities consistent with reports of prior functioning as well as clinical observations. Thus, its conclusions relate to Plaintiff's functional abilities during the period on or before the ALJ's decision. This new report is material because it provides an in-person psychological evaluation of Plaintiff's intellectual functioning, including communication skills and his ability to maintain attention and concentration, that could have influenced the Commissioner to decide the case differently. Therefore, the Appeals Council's categorical rejection of the assessment was in fact error, and the report's relevance should be evaluated on

1 remand.

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Next to the issue of an expedited administrative review on remand. Finally, this Court is mindful that almost four years have passed since Plaintiff's mother applied for benefits on his behalf when Plaintiff was 12 years old. Plaintiff is now 16 years old. Delay in resolution of this case is harmful for any litigant, but particularly in connection with benefits for children, which are intended to enable families to afford special education, medical treatment, physical rehabilitation, early intervention services, and personal needs assistance for the child. case of Myers ex rel. C.N. versus Astrue, 09-cv-1429. That's a 2012 Westlaw case at 4107453, at page 11. And that is a Northern District New York, September 18, 2012 case. And therein noting that the purpose of providing Social Security benefits to children is to assist them while they are children.

Accordingly, and consistent with similar cases in the Second Circuit and Northern District of New York where delay will create undue hardship, this Court directs that further proceedings in this case before the ALJ shall and must be completed within 120 days of the issuance of this Court's remand order, and that if the decision is a denial of benefits, a final decision of the Commissioner shall and must be rendered within sixty days of any administrative appeal.

So just to be clear, in this case the ALJ shall and must complete within one hundred days of the issuance of this Court's remand order, their review, and issue a decision as to the benefits. And thereafter, a final decision by the Commissioner must be rendered within sixty days of an administrative appeal. See case of Michaels v. Colvin, 621 F.App'x 35, at page 41, Second Circuit, 2015 case. See also Brandon C. versus Commissioner of Social Security, 21-cv-159. And that is a Magistrate Judge Baxter decision and that's found at 2023 Westlaw 8020257, at page 3. And that's a Northern District New York, November 20th, 2023 decision.

As a result, Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings is hereby granted; the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied; and this matter is reversed and remanded to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of Title 42, United States Code, Section 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with this Decision and Order.

That concludes this Court's reasoning, analysis and decision.

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Case 8:23-cv-00866-ML Document 15 Filed 09/11/24 Page 20 of 20 Decision - 9/5/2024 - 23-cv-866 CERTIFICATION I, EILEEN MCDONOUGH, RPR, CRR, Federal Official Realtime Court Reporter, in and for the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, do hereby certify that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States Code, that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the stenographically reported proceedings held by telephone conference in the above-entitled matter and that the transcript page format is in conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Elsen McDonough EILEEN MCDONOUGH, RPR, CRR Federal Official Court Reporter